We provide constructions of (m, 1)-programmable hash functions (PHFs) for m ≥ 2. Mimicking certain programmability properties of random oracles, PHFs can, e.g., be plugged into the generic constructions by Hofheinz and Kiltz (J. Cryptol. 2011) to yield digital signatures schemes from the strong RSA and strong q-Diffie-Hellman assumptions. As another application of PHFs, we propose new and efficient constructions of digital signature schemes from weaker assumptions, i.e., from the (standard, non-strong) RSA and the (standard, non-strong) q-Diffie-Hellman assumptions.
Introduction
Digital Signatures are one of the most fundamental cryptographic primitives. They are used as a building block in numerous high-level cryptographic protocols. Practical signature schemes are known whose security is based on relatively mild intractability assumptions such as the RSA [7] or the (bilinear) Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption [14] . However, their security can only be proved in the random oracle model [6] with all its limitations (e.g., [18, 27] ).
Standard Model Signatures. Signature schemes in the standard model (i.e., without using random oracles) are often considerably less efficient or based on much stronger assumptions. While tree-based signature schemes can be built from any one-way function [50] , these constructions are far from practical. On the other hand, "Hash-and-sign" signatures are considerably more efficient, but the most efficient of these schemes rely on specific "strong" number theoretic hardness assumptions RSA signatures. As a step towards practical signatures from the (standard) RSA assumption, Hohenberger and Waters [41, 40] proposed the first hash-and-sign signature scheme (HW signatures) whose security is based on the RSA assumption. HW signatures are computed as sig(M ) = g 1/P(M ) mod N , where g ∈ Z * N is a public element and P(M ) = e 1 · . . . · e |M | is the product of |M | distinct primes. Here each prime e i is uniquely determined by the i-bit prefix M |i of the message M , and for each generation of e i a number of primality tests have to be executed which is the dominant running time of signing (and verifying). The above signature scheme is only weakly secure under the RSA assumption, and a chameleon hash has to be used to make it fully secure, thereby doubling the signature size to two elements from Z N and adding ≈ 2kbit to the public-key size [40] . The main disadvantage of HW signatures is, however, the generation and testing of the |M | primes e 1 , . . . , e |M | necessary to compute the hash function P(M ). Concretely, for k = 80 bits security, HW signatures need to generate |M | = 160 random primes for the signing process.
Summary of our Contributions
As the main technical contribution we propose several new constructions of (m, 1)-PHFs for any m ≥ 1. In particular, we solve the open problem posed in [39] of constructing deterministic (m, 1)-PHFs for m > 2. Even though our main applications are digital signatures we remark that PHFs are a very general framework for designing and analyzing cryptographic protocols in the DiffieHellman and RSA setting. For example, in [39] , it was shown that PHFs imply collision-resistant hash functions and lead to elegant and simple proofs of Waters' IBE and signature schemes [54] and its countless variants (e.g., [16, 8] ). More importantly, a large body of cryptographic protocols with security in the standard model are using -implicitly or explicitly -the partitioning trick that is formalized in PHFs. To mention only a few examples, this ranges from collision-resistant hashing [21, 4] , digital signature schemes [13, 54] (also in various flavors [49, 52, 9] ), chosen-ciphertext secure encryption [16, 42, 36, 38, 15] , identity-based encryption [10, 11, 43, 19, 1] , attribute-based encryption [51] to symmetric authentication [44] . We expect that our new PHF constructions can also be applied to some of the mentioned applications.
We also show how to use our new (m, 1)-PHFs for generic constructions of short yet efficient hash-and-sign signatures whose security is based on weaker hardness assumptions: the q-DH and the RSA assumption. Whereas our q-DH schemes Sig q-DH [H] are (to the best of our knowledge) the first hash-and-sign schemes from this assumption, our RSA schemes Sig RSA [H] and Sig RSA [H] are conceptually different from HW signatures and we obtain a considerable efficiency improvement. A large number of new signature schemes with different tradeoffs can be derived by combining the generic signature schemes with PRFs. An overview of the efficiency of some resulting schemes and a comparison with existing schemes from [24, 31, 12, 39, 41] is provided in Table 1 . Our new schemes offer different tradeoffs between signature size, efficiency, and public-key size. The bigger the parameter m in the (m, 1)-PHF, the larger the public-key size, the shorter the signatures. To obtain extremely short and/or efficient signatures, the size of the public key can get quite large. Concretely, with a public-key of size 26mbit we obtain 200 bit signatures from the (Strong) q-DH assumption. These are the shortest knwon standard-model digital signatures in bilinear groups. Remarkably, Sig SRSA [H cfs ] which instatiates the Strong RSA signatures from [39] with our new (m, 1)-PHF H cfs for m ≥ 6, results in a hash-and-sign signature scheme where the signing procedure is dominated by one single modular exponentiation. This is the first RSA-based signature scheme whose signing complexity is not dominated by generating random primes. 2 Hence signing is essentially as efficient as RSA full-domain-hash [7] with the drawback of a huge public-key.
While these short signatures are mostly of theoretical interest and contribute to the problem of determining concrete bounds on the size of standard-model signatures, we think that in certain applications even a large public-key is tolerable. In particular, our public key sizes are still comparable to the ones of recently proposed lattice-based signatures [47, 32, 19, 15] .
We note furthermore, that it is possible to apply efficiency improvements from [41] to our RSA-based schemes as well. This allows us to reduce the number of primality tests required for signing and verification sigificantly. More precisely, it is possible to transform each signature scheme requiring λ primality tests into a scheme which requires only λ/c primality tests, at the cost of loosing a factor of 2 −c in the security reduction. For example, Sig Signature scheme Assumption Signature Size (bits) Efficiency Public key size (bits)
The RSA-based chameleon hash function from [40] was used (adding 1 × |ZN | to signature size). § Security reduction loses an additional factor of 2 40 . Table 1 : Signature sizes of different schemes. Rows with grey background indicate new results from this paper. The chosen parameters provide unforgeability with k = 80 bits of security after revealing maximally q = 2 30 signatures. RSA signatures are instantiated with a modulus of |N | = 1024 bits, Bilinear signatures in asymmetric pairings using a BN curve [3] with log p = 160 bits. We assume that elements in G1 can be represented by |G1| = 160 bits, while an element G2 by |G2| = 320 bits. The description of the bilinear group/modulus N is not counted in the public key. We assume l-bit messages with l = 2k = 160 in order to provide k bits of security (to sign longer messages, we can apply a collision-resistant hash function first). The efficiency column counts the dominant operations for signing. For Bilinear and RSA signatures this counts the number of modular exponentiations, for RSA signatures k × Pµ counts the number of random µ-bit primes that need to be generated to evaluate function P(·). (For µ 60, 1 × Pµ takes more time than 1 × Exp.)
cover-free sets, we construct a deterministic (m, 1)-PHF H cfs with public parameters of O(km 2 ) group elements. This solves the problem from [39] of constructing deterministic (m, 1)-PHFs for m > 2. We remark that cover-free sets were already used in [26, 35, 23 ] to construct identitybased encryption schemes. Furthermore, we propose a randomized (m, 1)-PHF H rand with public parameters of O(m 2 ) group elements and small randomness space. Finally, we construct a weakly secure deterministic (m, 1)-PHF H Weak with public parameters of m group elements. The latter PHF already appeared implicitly in the context of identity/attribute-based encryption [20, 51] (generalizing [10] ). Weakly secure PHFs only yield weakly secure signature schemes that need to be "upgraded" to fully secure schemes using a chameleon hash function. 
where s is a short random bitstring, H(·) is a (m, 1)-PHF, and P(s) := e 1 · . . . · e |s| is the product of |s| primes e 1 , . . . , e |s| , where the ith prime is uniquely determined by the ith prefix s |i of the randomness s. (If the PHF H is probabilistic, sig additionally contains a small random bitstring r.) Our security proof is along the lines of [39] , but using P enables a reduction to the RSA assumption (Theorem 4.1) in the standard model. The main conceptual novelty is that we apply P to the randomness s rather than the message M as in HW signatures. Because the values s are relatively small, our scheme is considerably more efficient than that of [41] . Concretely, the length of s is controlled by the PHF parameter m as |s| = log q + k/m, where q is an upper bound on the number of signatures the scheme supports. (See Appendix A for a formal argument.) For k = 80 bits security and q = 2 30 (as recommended in [7] ) we can make use of our new constructions of (m, 1)-PHFs with m ≥ 2. For example, with a (4, 1)-PHF, the bitstring s can be as small as 50 bits which leads to very small signatures. More importantly, since the function P(s) only has to generate |s| distinct primes e 1 , . . . , e |s| (compared to |M | |s| primes in HW signatures), the signing and verification algorithms are considerably faster. The drawback of our new signature scheme is that the system parameters of H grow with m.
Bilinear Signatures. Our new q-DH signatures Sig q-DH [H] are of the form
where again s is a short random bitstring, H is a (m, 1) programmable hash function, and d(·) is a special (secret) function mapping bitstrings to Z p . Since D(s) := g d(s) can be computed publicly, verification is done by using the properties of the bilinear group. Security is proved under the q-DH assumption in the standard model (Theorem 5.1). Similar to our RSA-based signatures the length of s is controlled by the PHF parameter m. For example, for m = 8 we obtain standard-model signatures of size |G| + |s| = 160 + 40 = 200 bits.
Full Domain Signatures. We remark that full-domain hash signature schemes over a homomorphic domain (e.g., RSA-FDH [7] and BLS signatures [14] ) instantiated with (m, 1)-PHFs provide efficient m-time signature schemes without random oracles. This nicely complements the impossibility results from [27] who show that without the homomorphic property this is not possible. We remark that an instantiation of RSA-FDH as a m-time signature scheme was independently observed in [25] .
Proof Techniques and Related Work. Our RSA-based signature scheme represents a combination of techniques from [39] and [41] . Namely, in the basic RSA-based signature scheme from [39] , a signature is of the form (H(M ) 1/s mod N, s) for a prime s. The use of a programmable hash function H enables very efficient schemes, whose security however cannot be reduced to the standard (non-strong) RSA problem, since a forged signature (H(M ) 1/s * , s * ) corresponds to an RSA inversion with adversarially chosen exponent s * . On the other hand, the (basic, weakly secure) signature scheme from [41] is of the form g 1/P(M ) mod N . The special structure of P (which maps a message M to the product of |M | primes) makes it possible to prove security under the standard RSA assumption. However, since P is applied to messages (i.e., 160-bit strings), evaluation of P requires a large number of primality tests. We combine the best of both worlds with signatures of the form (H(M ) 1/P(s) mod N, s) for short (e.g., 40-bit) random strings s. In contrast to the scheme of [41] , this directly yields a fully secure signature scheme, so we do not need a chameleon hash function.
In the security proof of our RSA signatures we distinguish between two types of forgers: type I forgers recycle a value from {s 1 , . . . , s q } for the forgery, where the s i 's are the random bitstrings used for the simulated signatures; type II forgers use a new value s * ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s q } for the forgery and therefore are more difficult to reduce to the RSA assumption. For the reduction of type II forgers to the RSA assumption we can use a clever "prefix-guessing" technique from [41] to embed the prime e from the RSA challenge in the function P(·) such that the product P(s * ) contains e. 3 Similar to the proof of HK signatures [39] , the reduction for Type I forgers makes use of the (m, 1) programmability of H(·).
Strong q-DH signatures from [39] can actually be viewed as our q-DH signatures from (2) instantiated with the special function d(s) = x+s (where x is part of the secret-key). In our scheme, the leverage to obtain security from q-DH is that the function D(s) := g d(s) acts as a (poly, 1)-PHF. That is, d(·) can be setup such that (with non-negligible probability) d(s i ) = x + a(s i ) for a(s i ) = 0 but d(s * ) = x, where s 1 , . . . , s q is the randomness used for the generated signatures and s * is the randomness used for the forgery.
Open Problems
A number of interesting open problems remain. We ask how to construct (deterministic) (m, 1)-PHFs for m ≥ 1 with smaller parameters than the ones from Table 2 . Since the constructions of cover free sets are known to be optimal up to a log factor, a new method will be required. Furthermore, obtaining truely practical signatures from the RSA or factoring assumption is still an open problem. In particular, we ask for a construction of hash-and-sign (strong) RSA signatures that do not require the generation of primes at signing.
Preliminaries
For k ∈ N, we write 1 k for the string of k ones, and [k] for {1, . . . , k}. Moreover, |x| denotes the length of a bitstring x, while |S| denotes the size of a set S. Further, s $ ← S denotes the sampling a uniformly random element s of S. For an algorithm A, we write z $ ← A(x, y, . . .) to indicate that A is a (probabilistic) algorithm that outputs z on input (x, y, . . .).
Digital signatures
A digital signature scheme Sig = (Gen, Sign, Vfy) consists of three algorithms. Key generation Gen generates a keypair (pk, sk) $ ← Gen(1 k ) for a secret signing key sk and a public verification key pk. The signing algorithm Sign inputs a message and the secret signing key, and returns a signature σ $ ← Sign(sk, m) of the message. The verification algorithm Vfy takes a verification key and a message with corresponding signature as input, and returns b ← Vfy(pk, m, σ) where b ∈ {accept, reject}. We require the usual correctness properties.
Let us recall the existential unforgeability against chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA) security experiment [33] , played between a challenger and a forger F.
1. The challenger runs Gen to generate a keypair (pk, sk). The forger receives pk as input. 2. The forger may ask the challenger to sign a number of messages. To query the i-th signature, F submits a message m i to the challenger. The challenger returns a signature σ i under sk for this message. 3. The forger outputs a message m * and signature σ * .
F wins the game, if accept ← Vfy(pk, m * , σ * ), that is, σ * is a valid signature for m * , and m * = m i for all i. We say that F (t, q, )-breaks the EUF-CMA security of Sig, if F runs in time t, makes at most q signing queries, and has success probability . We say that Sig is EUF-CMA secure, or Sig is fully secure, if is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm F.
We also say, that a scheme is weakly secure, if it meets the above security definition, but the adversary can not choose the messages to be signed adaptively. Instead it has to commit to a list m 1 , . . . , m q before seeing the public key. There exist efficient generic techniques to convert a weakly secure signature scheme into a fully secure one, e.g., using chameleon hashes [45] .
Prime Numbers, Factoring, and the RSA Assumption
For x ∈ N let π(x) denote the number of primes between 0 and x. The following lemma is a direct consequence of Chebyshev's bounds on π(x) (see [34] , for instance).
Lemma 2.1.
We say that a prime p is a safe prime, if p = 2p + 1 and p is also prime. Let p and q be two randomly chosen k/2-bit safe primes, and let N = pq. Let e ∈ Z φ(n) be a random integer, relatively prime to φ(N ). We say that an algorithm A (t, )-breaks the RSA assumption, if A runs in time t and Pr[y
We assume that there exists no algorithm that (t, )-breaks the RSA assumption with polynomial t and non-negligible . We denote with QR N the group of quadratic residues modulo N . The following lemma, which is due to Shamir [53] , is useful for the security proof of the generic RSA-based signature scheme described in Section 4.
Lemma 2.2.
There is an efficient algorithm that, on input y, z ∈ Z N and integers e, f ∈ Z such that gcd(e, f ) = 1 and z e ≡ y f mod n, computes x ∈ Z N satisfying x e ≡ y mod N .
Generalized Birthday Bound
Although not explicitly stated, the following lemma is implicit in [37] . We will apply it several times in the security proofs for our generic signature schemes. Lemma 2.3. Let A be a set with |A| = a. Let X 1 , . . . , X q be q independent random variables, taking uniformly random values from A. Then the probability that there exist m+1 pairwise distinct indices
Pairing groups and q-Diffie-Hellman.
The generic signature scheme we describe in Section 5 is defined on families of groups with bilinear pairing. A pairing group PG = PG k = (G, G T , p,ê, g) consists of groups G and G T with prime order p, where p is a 2k-bit prime, a generator g ∈ G, and a non-degenerate bilinear pairing map e : G × G → G T . We say that an adversary A (t, )-breaks the q-Diffie-Hellman (q-DH) assumption, if A runs in time t and Pr[g
We assume that there exists no algorithm that (t, )-breaks the q-Diffie-Hellman Inversion assumption with polynomial t and non-negligible .
Programmable Hash Functions

Definitions
Let G = (G k ) be a family of groups, indexed by security parameter k ∈ N. We omit the subscript when the reference to the security parameter is clear, thus write G for G k .
A group hash function H over G with input length l = l(k) consists of two efficient algorithms PHF.Gen and PHF.Eval. The probabilistic algorithm κ $ ← PHF.Gen(1 k ) generates a hash key κ for security parameter k. Algorithm PHF.Eval is a deterministic algorithm, taking as input a hash function key κ and X ∈ {0, 1} l , and returning PHF.Eval(κ, X) ∈ G.
if there is an efficient trapdoor key generation algorithm PHF.TrapGen and an efficient trapdoor evaluation algorithm PHF.TrapEval with the following properties.
1. The probabilistic trapdoor generation algorithm (κ, τ )
takes as input group elements g, h ∈ G, and produces a hash function key κ together with trapdoor information τ . 2. For all generators g, h ∈ G, the keys κ
3. On input X ∈ {0, 1} l and trapdoor information τ , the deterministic trapdoor evaluation
, and all X 1 , . . . , X m ∈ {0, 1} l and Z 1 , . . . , Z n ∈ {0, 1} l such that X i = Z j for all i, j, we have
, and the probability is taken over the trapdoor τ produced along with κ. If γ is negligible and δ is noticeable, then we also say that H is (m, n)-programmable for short. If H is (1, q)-programmable for every polynomial q = q(k), then we say that H is (1, poly)-programmable.
In settings in which the group order is hidden, we will use a refinement of the PHF definition:
if it is (m, n, γ, δ)-programmable as in Definition 3.1, but with the strengthened requirement 4'. For all prime numbers e with 2 l < e ≤ |G|, all g, h ∈ G, and all κ generated by κ
, and the probability is taken over the trapdoor τ produced along with κ.
Hofheinz and Kiltz [37] have also introduced the notion of randomized programmable hash functions. A randomized group hash function H with input length l = l(k) and randomness space R = (R k ) consists of two efficient algorithms RPHF.Gen and RPHF.Eval. Algorithm RPHF.Gen is probabilistic, and generates a hash key κ $ ← RPHF.Gen(1 k ) for security parameter k. The deterministic algorithm RPHF.Eval takes randomness r ∈ R k and X ∈ {0, 1} l as input, and returns a group element RPHF.Eval(κ, X) ∈ G. 1. The probabilistic algorithm PHF.TrapGen(1 k , g, h) takes as input group elements g, h ∈ G, and produces a key κ and trapdoor τ . For all generators g, h ∈ G, the keys κ
2. The deterministic trapdoor evaluation algorithm takes as input X ∈ {0, 1} l and r ∈ R k , and produces two functions (a
3. On input of trapdoor τ , X ∈ {0, 1} l , and index i ∈ [m], the RPHF.TrapRand algorithm produces r ← RPHF.TrapRand(τ, X, i) with r ∈ R k . For all g, h ∈ G, all κ generated by (κ, τ )
. . , X m , and r X i = RPHF.TrapRand(τ, X i , i), we require that the r X i are independent and uniformly distributed random variables over R k . 4. For all g, h ∈ G and all κ generated by (κ, τ )
, 1} l and Z 1 , . . . , Z n ∈ {0, 1} l such that X i = Z j , and for allr 1 , . . . ,r n ∈ R k and r X i ← RPHF.TrapRand(τ, X i , i), we have
, and the probability is taken over the trapdoor τ produced along with κ. Here X i may depend on X j and r X j for j < i, and the Z 1 , . . . , Z n may depend on all X i and r i . Again we omit γ and δ, if γ is negligible and δ is noticeable. Randomized evasively programmable hash functions are defined as in Definition 3.2.
In the remainder of this Section we propose a number of new PHFs offering different trade-offs. Our results are summarized in Table 2 . Table 2 : Overview of our constructions of (randomized/weak) programmable hash functions. Rows with grey background are new constructions from this paper.
Multi-generator programmable hash function
The programmable hash function described in Definition 3.4 below was (implicitly) introduced in [54] . An explicit analysis can be found in [37] .
Definition 3.4. Let G = (G k ) be a group family, and l = l(k) be a polynomial. Let H Wat = (PHF.Gen, PHF.Eval) be defined as follows.
•
Theorem 3.5 (Theorem 3.6 of [37] ). For any fixed polynomial q = q(k) and any group with known order, H Wat is an evasively
Although evasive programmability was not introduced in [37] , it follows from their proof, since the values of a Z j that occur there are bounded in the sense |a Z j | < 2 l . We remark that Theorem 3.5 also carries over to groups of unknown order.
A new deterministic programmable hash function
Let S, T be sets. We say that S does not cover T , if T ⊆ S. Let d, m, s be integers, and let F = (F i ) i∈[s] be a family of s subsets of [d] . We say that F is m-cover free, if for any set I containing (up to) m indices I = {i 1 , . . . , i m } ⊆ [s], it holds that F j ⊆ i∈I F i for any j which is not contained in I. In other words, if |I| ≤ m, then the union i∈I F i is not covering F j for all j ∈ [s] \ I. We say that F is w-uniform, if |F i | = w for all i ∈ [s]. Lemma 3.6 ([28, 46] ). There is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that, on input of integers m, s = 2 l , returns d ∈ N and set family F = (F i ) i∈ [s] such that F is m-cover free over [d] and wuniform, where d ≤ 16m 2 l and w = d/4m.
In the following we will associate X ∈ {0, 1} l to a subset F i , i ∈ [s], by interpreting X as an integer in the range [0, 2 l − 1], and setting i = X + 1. We will write F X to denote the subset associated to X. Definition 3.7. Let G = (G k ) be a group family, and l = l(k) and m = m(k) be polynomials. Define s = 2 l , d = 16m 2 l, and w = d/4m. Let H cfs = (PHF.Gen, PHF.Eval) be as follows.
Theorem 3.8. Let G = G k be a group of known order p. H cfs is an evasively (m, 1, γ, δ)-programmable hash function with γ = 0 and δ = 1/(16m 2 l).
Proof. Consider the following algorithms.
Then it sets h t = gh bt , and
• On input (τ, X), PHF.TrapEval sets b X = i∈F X b i , and a X = 1 if t ∈ F X , and a X = 0 if t ∈ F X , and returns (a X , b X ). PHF.TrapGen outputs a vector of independent and uniformly distributed group elements, thus we have γ = 0. Fix X 1 , . . . , X m , Z ∈ [0, 2 l − 1]. Since F is a m-cover free set family, there must be an index t such that t ∈ m i=1 F X i , but t ∈ F Z . Since t is picked uniformly random among 16m 2 l possibilities, we have t = t , and thus a X i = 0 and a Z = 1, with probability δ = 1/(16m 2 l). Finally, a Z = 1 implies gcd(a Z , e) = 1 for all primes e, thus H cfs is evasively programmable. Theorem 3.8 can be generalized to groups of hidden order. The proof proceeds exactly like the proof of Theorem 3.8, except that we have to approximate the group order. E.g., for the group of quadratic residues QR n , we can sample random exponents b i $ ← Z n 2 . This way, we can sample nearly uniform (1/ √ n-close) group elements h i = h b i , which yields the following theorem.
Theorem 3.9. Let G = QR n be the group of quadratic residues modulo n = pq, where p and q are safe distinct primes. H cfs is a (m, 1, γ, δ)-evasively programmable hash function over G with γ = d/ √ n and δ = 1/(16m 2 l).
A randomized programmable hash function
In [39] a randomized (2, 1)-PHF was described which we now generalize to a randomzied (m, 1)-PRF, for any m ≥ 1.
Definition 3.10. Let G = (G k ) be a group family, and m = m(k) be a polynomial. In the following, let [X] 2 l ∈ Z denote a canonical interpretation of a field element X ∈ F 2 l as an integer between 0 and 2 l − 1. We assume that X and [X] 2 l are efficiently computable from one another. Let H rand = (PHF.Gen, PHF.Eval) be defined as follows.
• RPHF.Eval(κ, X; r) parses X, r ∈ F 2 l , and computes and returns
Theorem 3.11. For any group G of known order, H rand is evasively (m, 1, 0, 1/2)-programmable.
For the group G = QR N of quadratic residues modulo N = pq for safe distinct primes p and q, the function H rand is evasively (m, 1, (
Proof. We describe suitable algorithms RPHF.TrapGen and RPHF.TrapEval. First assume a group G with known order |G|.
• RPHF.TrapGen(1 k , g, h) uniformly picks i * ∈ [2m], as well as ζ j ∈ F 2 l and β 0 ,
and so defines
Since the β i,j are chosen independently and uniformly, this implies that κ is distributed exactly like the output of RPHF.Gen.
• RPHF.TrapEval(τ, X, r) computes and outputs
As the ζ j are uniform and independent of κ, so is r j . It remains to prove that for all prime e with 2 l < e ≤ |G|, all κ, X 1 , . . . , X m , Z, for r j $ ← RPHF.TrapRand(τ, X j , j), and allr (with dependencies as in Definition 3.3), we have a X j (r j ) = 0 for all j, but gcd(e, a Z (r)) = 1 with probability at least 1/2 over τ . So fix e, κ, X i , and Z. First, we have a
since e > 2 l . Hence, we only have to upper bound the probability for i * Z + r ∈ {ζ j } j∈ [m] .
. Now i * ∈ [2m] is uniform and independent of Z and the ζ j , and the set {(ζ j −r)/Z} j∈ [m] has cardinality at most m. Hence, i * ∈ {(ζ j −r)/Z} j∈ [m] with probability at most 1/2 as desired.
This proves the statement for G with known group order. Now assume G = QR N . We define RPHF.TrapGen, RPHF.TrapEval, and RPHF.TrapRand as above, with the difference that we sample β 0 , β i,j ∈ {0, . . . , N/4 } because the group order |G| = |QR N | = ϕ(N ) is unknown. This approximate sampling of a random exponent yields a statistical error of at most (2m 2 + 1)/ √ N in the distribution of κ, as sampled by RPHF.TrapGen. The remaining part of the proof remains unchanged.
A Weak Programmable Hash Function
Essentially, a weak programmable hash function is a programmable hash function according to Definition 3.1, except that the trapdoor generation algorithm receives a list X 1 , . . . , X m ∈ {0, 1} l as additional input. On the one hand this allows us to construct significantly more efficient deterministic programmable hash functions, while on the other hand our generic signatures schemes described in Sections 5 and 4 are only weakly secure when instantiated with weak programmable hash functions. Fully secure signature schemes can be obtained by applying a generic conversion from weak to full security, for instance using chameleon hashes [45] which can be constructed based on standard assumptions like discrete logarithms [45] , RSA [2, 40] , or factoring [45] . Definition 3.12. A group hash function is a weak (m, n, γ, δ)-programmable hash function, if there is a (probabilistic) algorithm PHF.TrapGen and a (deterministic) algorithm PHF.TrapEval such that:
. . , X m ) takes as input group elements g, h ∈ G and X 1 , . . . , X m ∈ {0, 1} l , and produces a hash function key κ together with trapdoor information τ . 2. [20, 51] and [10] for m = 1. Definition 3.13. Let G = (G k ) be a group family, and l = l(k) and m = m(k) be polynomials. Let H Weak = (PHF.Gen, PHF.Eval) be defined as follows.
Here we interpret the l-bit strings X i , i ∈ [m], as integers in the canonical way. Proof. Consider the following algorithms.
• PHF.TrapGen(1 k , g, h, X 1 , . . . , X m ) samples m+1 random integers β 0 , . . . , β m $ ← Z p and X 0 $ ← {0, 1} l . Then it computes the coefficients (α 0 , . . . , α m ) of the polynomial
The algorithm sets τ = (α 0 , . . . , α m , β 0 , . . . , β m ), and κ = (h 0 , . . . , h m ), where
Just like the PHF.Gen algorithm, PHF.TrapGen returns a vector κ of uniformly distributed group elements, which implies γ = 0. Note also that we have a X = α(X) = 0 for all X ∈ {X 1 , . . . , X m }. It is left to observe that gcd(e, a Z ) = 1 ⇔ α(Z) ≡ 0 mod e ⇔ Z ∈ {X 1 , . . . , X m }, since e > 2 l is prime and 0 ≤ X i , Z < 2 l .
Again we can generalize Theorem 3.14 to groups of hidden order. The proof proceeds exactly like the proof of Theorem 3.14, except that we have to approximate the group order. For the group of quadratic residues QR n , we can sample the random exponents b i from Z n 2 for i ∈ [0, m], which yields the following theorem. 4 Signatures from the RSA Problem
Construction
Let l = l(k) and λ = λ(k) be polynomials. Let H = (PHF.Gen, PHF.Eval) be group hash functions over G = QR N with input length l. We define the signature scheme Sig RSA [H] = (Gen, Sign, Vfy) as follows.
Gen(1 k ): The key generation algorithm picks two large safe k/2-bit primes p and q, and sets N = pq.
Then it generates a group hash function key κ $ ← PHF.Gen(1 k ) for the group QR N . Finally it chooses a random key K for the pseudorandom function PRF : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} r and picks c $ ← {0, 1} r , where r = log N . These values define a function F as
where µ, called the resolving index of z, denotes the smallest positive integer such that PRF K (µ||z)⊕c is an odd prime. Here ⊕ denotes the bit-wise XOR operation, and we interpret the r-bit string returned by F as an integer in the obvious way. (The definition of F is the same as in [41] . It is possible to replace the PRF with an 2k 2 -wise independent hash function [17] .) The public key is pk = (n, κ, K, c), the secret key is sk = (pk, p, q).
In the following we will write H(M ) shorthand for PHF.Eval(κ, M ), and define P : {0, 1} λ → N as P(s) = λ i=1 F(s |i ), where s |i is the i-th prefix of s, i.e., the bit string consisting of the first i bits of s. We also define s |0 = ∅, where ∅ is the empty string, for technical reasons.
Sign(sk, M ): On input of secret key sk and message M ∈ {0, 1} l , the signing algorithm picks s $ ← {0, 1} λ uniformly random and computes
where the inverse of P(s) is computed modulo the order φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1) of the multiplicative group Z * N . The signature is (σ, s) ∈ Z N × {0, 1} λ .
Vfy(pk, M, (σ, s)): On input of pk , message M , and signature (σ, s), return accept if
Otherwise return reject. We postpone a full proof to Appendix C.1, and only give a brief outline here. As customary in proofs for similar signature schemes (e.g., [24, 30, 37] ), we distinguish between Type I and Type II forgers. A Type I forger forges a signature of the form (M * , σ * , s * ) with s * = s i for some i ∈ [q]. (That is, a Type I forger reuses some s i from a signature query.) A Type II forger returns a signature with a fresh s * .
Security
It will be easiest to first describe how to treat a Type II forger F. Recall that we need to put up a simulation that is able to generate q signatures (M i , σ i , s i ) i∈[q] for adversarially chosen messages M i . To do this, we choose all s i in advance. We then prepare the PHF H using PHF.TrapGen, but relative to generators g and h for which we know P(s i )-th roots. (That is, we set g :=ĝ E and h =ĥ E for E := i P(s i ).) This allows to generate signatures for F; also, by the security of the PHF H, this change goes unnoticed by F. However, each time F outputs a new signature, it essentially outputs a fresh root g 1/P(s * ) of g, from which we can derive a P(s * )-th root ofĝ. To construct an RSA adversary from this experiment, we have to embed an auxiliary given exponent e into the definition of P, such thatĝ 1/P(s * ) allows to deriveĝ 1/e . This can be done along the lines of the proof of the Hohenberger-Waters scheme [41] . Concretely, for initially given values s i and e, we can set up P such that (a) e does not divide any P(s i ), but (b) for any other fixed s * , the probability that e divides P(s * ) is significant. Note that in our scheme, the s i are chosen by the signer, and thus our simulation can select them in advance. In contrast to that, the HW scheme uses the signed messages M i as arguments to P, and thus their argument achieves only a weaker form of security in which the forger has to commit to all signature queries beforehand. Now the proof for Type I forgers proceeds similarly, but with the additional complication that we have to prepare one or more signatures of the form H(M i ) 1/P(s i ) for the same s i = s * that F eventually uses in his forgery. We resolve this complication by relying on the PHF properties of H. Namely, we first choose all s i and guess i (i.e., the index of the s i with s i = s * ). We then prepare H with generators g, h such that we know all P(s j )th roots of h (for all j), and all P(s j )th roots of g for all s j = s i . Our hope is that whenever F asks for the signature of some M j with s j = s i , we have H(M i ) ∈ h , so we can compute H(M j ) 1/P(s j ) . At the same time, we hope that H(M * ) ∈ h has a nontrivial g-factor, so we can build an RSA adversary as for Type II forgers. The PHF property of H guarantees a significant probability that this works out, provided that there are no more than m indices j with s j = s i (i.e., provided that there are no (m + 1)-collisions). However, using a birthday bound, we can reasonably upper bound the probability of (m + 1)-collisions.
Deterministic signatures with Weak Security
We now give a variant of our scheme which is slightly more efficient but only offers weak security. A weakly secure signature scheme can be updated to a fully secure one by using a (randomized) Chameleon Hash Function. The weakly secure signature scheme Sig * RSA [H] = (Gen, Sign, Vfy) uses the key generation algorithm with Sig RSA and signing and verification algorithms are defined as follows.
Sign(sk, M ): On input of secret key sk and message M ∈ {0, 1} l , the signing algorithm computes
where
e., the product is over the first λ prefixes of PRF K (M ). The signature is σ ∈ Z N . Vfy(pk, M, σ): On input of pk , message M , and signature σ, return accept if
Otherwise return reject.
The proof of security is analog to the one of Theorem 4.1 and therefore omitted.
Efficiency
Given P(s) and φ(N ), computing σ = H(M ) 1/P(s) can also be carried out by one single exponentiation. Since one single evaluation of P(·) has to perform (expected) λr many primality tests (for r-bit primes), the dominiant part of signing and verification is to compute P(s), for s ∈ {0, 1} λ . Theorem 4.1 tells us that if H is a (m, 1)-PHF we can set λ = log q + k/m, see Appendix A for more details. Hohenberger and Waters [41] proposed several ways to improve the efficiency of their RSA-based signature scheme. These improvements apply to our RSA-based schemes as well.
Using a larger alphabet. Instead of applying the function F to each prefix of s, one could break s into larger, say u-bit, chunks. This would result in a decrease of security by a factor of about 1/(2 u −1), since the simulator in the Type II forger game has to guess which of the 1/(2 u −1) values the forger will use. However, for small values of u, this reduces the cost of signing and verifying significantly (about 1/2 for u = 2), while imposing only a moderate decrease in security (about 1/3 for u = 2). In particular of interest is a variant of our scheme using P(s) := F(s). In this case the security reduction of Theorem 4.1 looses an additional factor of 2 λ = q · 2 k/m ≈ q (for m ≈ k) but the scheme only has to generate one single prime for signing and verifying.
Include the resolving index in the signature. In order to reduce the number of primality tests to be performed during signature verification, it is possible to include the resolving indices in the signatures. This increases the size of signatures by a factor of λ · log( log n 2 ), and we have to modify the verification algorithm such that a signature is rejected if a resolving index exceeds log( log n 2 ), which imposes a negligible correctness error.
Using smaller prime exponents. Defining the scheme such that instead of log N -bit primes only small prime exponents are used, say r-bit for some 2k ≤ r < log N , yields a considerable efficiency improvement, since the signing and verifying algorithms need only find small primes. However, in this case we can reduce the security of our schemes only to some low-exponent RSA assumption, that is, the RSA assumption with exponents smaller than 2 r . Moreover, when instantiated with a weak programmable hash function plus chameleon hash, then our schemes can also be used as online-offline signature schemes as introduced by Even, Goldreich, and Micali [29] 5 Signatures from the q-Diffie-Hellman Problem
Construction
Let G, G T be groups of prime order p with bilinear mapê : G × G → G T . Let l = l(k) and λ = λ(k) be polynomials. Let H = (PHF.Gen, PHF.Eval) and D = (PHF.Gen , PHF.Eval ) be group hash functions over G with input length l, such that D is programmable using algorithms (PHF.TrapGen , PHF.TrapEval ). We define Sig q-DH [H, D] = (Gen, Sign, Vfy) as follows.
Gen(1 k ): The key generation algorithm generates hash function keys through κ
Note that κ is computed using the trapdoor key generation procedure. The public key is defined as pk = (ĝ, κ, κ ), the secret key is sk = (pk, y, τ ).
In the following we will write H(M ) shorthand for PHF.Eval(κ, M ) and D(s) for PHF.Eval(κ , s). We write d(s) shorthand for the function computing (a, b) ← PHF.TrapEval (τ , s) and returning a + yb. Note that D(s) =ĝ d(s) , and that the functions H and D can be computed given the public key, while d can be computed given the secret key.
Sign(sk, M ): On input of secret key sk and message M ∈ {0, 1} l , the signing algorithm samples s $ ← {0, 1} λ uniformly random until 4 d(s) ≡ 0 mod p, and computes
The signature is (σ, s) ∈ G × {0, 1} λ .
Vfy(pk, M, (σ, s)): On input of public key pk, message M and signature (σ, s), return accept if
We have D(s) = 1 ∈ G, and therefore d(s) ≡ 0 mod p, with overwhelming probability, if the discrete logarithm assumption holds in G. To see this, observe that d(s) = 0 is equivalent to a+yb = 0, thus the discrete logarithm of h = g y to base g is determined by running (a, b) ← PHF.TrapEval (τ , s) and computing y = −ab −1 .
Security
Theorem 5.1. Let H be (m, 1, γ, δ)-programmable and D be (1, poly, γ , δ )-programmable. Suppose there exists a (t, q, )-forger F breaking the security of Sig q-DH [H, D] against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message attacks. Then there exists an adversary that (t , )-breaks the q-DiffieHellman assumption with t ≈ t and
The proof is conceptually similar to the one for the RSA case (Theorem C.1), and we postpone it to Appendix C.2.
Efficiency
To compute a signature, the signer must compute H(M ) = PHF.Eval(κ, M ) first, and then
One could also compute κ via trapdoor generation as (κ, τ ) $ ← PHF.TrapGen(1 k , g, g x ) during key generation, and then compute a signature by first running (a, b) ← PHF.TrapEval(τ, M ) and then computing
In this way, a signature can be computed by performing one single exponentiation in G. As we will show in Appendix A, the parameter λ can be set to λ = q + k/m when the scheme is instantiated with a (m, 1)-PHF. We remark that the scheme can also be instantiated in asymmetric pairing groups where the pairing is given byê :
In that case we let the element σ from the signature be in G 1 such that σ can be represented in 160 bits, as well as the group elements decribing hash function H. The elements decribing hash function D in the public key are from G 2 . It can be verified that the following proof also holds in asymmetric pairing groups. In this case, we rely on the assumption that computing g
[ A A bound on the size of the randomness
The efficiency of our two signature schemes from Section 5 and 4 depends on the randomness s ∈ {0, 1} λ . Following [37] we now show that it suffices to choose λ = log q + k/m, where q is the number of allowed signature queries and m is the parameter from the (m, 1)-PHF. Following the concrete security approach of Bellare and Ristenpart [5] , we define the success ratio of an adversary A running in time t and having success probability as SR(A) = /t. We require that a cryptosystem should be implemented with security parameter ("bits of security") k such that SR(A) ≤ 2 −k+1 for any adversary A.
q-DH based Signatures. For an (t A , A )-adversary A against the EUF-CMA security of Sig q-DH , we relate the success ratio of A to the success ratio of an (t B , B )-adversary B against the q-DH problem. Assuming t A = t B for simplicity (in Theorem 5.1 we have t A = t ≈ t = t B ) and using that γ = 0 for all our programmable hash functions over known-order groups, we apply the bound from Theorem 5.1 to obtain
Now, clearly we have SR(A) ≤ 2 −k+1 , if both 2 mλ ≤ 2 −k . The relevant bound to determine λ is the second equation which yields to λ ≥ log q + k/m, as claimed. 5 RSA-based Signatures. We follow a similar approach to derive the parameter sizes for our RSA-based constructions. For an (t A , A )-adversary A against the EUF-CMA security of Sig RSA , we relate the success ration of A to the success ratio of an (t B , B )-adversary B against the RSA problem. Let us first simplify the bound of Theorem 4.1 a little. We assume that
For instance, consider k = 80, then usual choices are r = log n = 1024, l = 160, q < 2 80 , and we have γ ≤ 16m 2 l/ √ n for our constructions in Section 3. If we also assume that the pseudorandom function is secure, then the above assumption seems reasonable. Applying Theorem 4.1 we thus have
Assuming that the best way of solving an RSA instance is factoring the modulus N , we require that N is chosen such that 2 −k−1 ≥ 
B Strong q-problems
Let S(c) be the solution to a problem instance, such that S(c) is hard to compute from c. In a q-problem an adversary is given q (polynomially many) "solved problem instances" (c i , S(c i )) (for random c i ) and some challenge instance c ∈ {c 1 , . . . , c q } and has to compute S(c). In Strong q-problems an adversary only has to come up with a fresh solved instance (c, S(c)) for an arbitrary c ∈ {c 1 , . . . , c q } of its choice. Strong q-problems are naturally well-suited for building (weakly secure) signature schemes by defining the signature on M to be S(M ), whereas it seems more difficult from (standard) q-problems. To understand the difference between strong and non-strong problems, let us verify that the (Strong) q-DH and the (Strong) RSA problems can be naturally interpreted as (Strong) q-problems.
For the q-DH case, let g and h = g x be two generators of a prime order group G. A problem instance for c ∈ Z |G| is given by S(c) := g 1/(x+c) . It is well-known [48] that the q-problem is equivalent to the q-DH problem which is given g, g x , . . . , g x q , compute g 1/x . The same related also holds between the Strong q-problem and the Strong q-DH problem (in which the adversary has to compute (c, g 1/(x+c) ) for any c ∈ Z |G| ).
In the RSA case let N = pq be an RSA modulus and let y ∈ Z N . A problem instance for a prime e is given by S(e) = y 1/e mod N . It is implicit in many prior works (e.g., [24] ) that the corresponding q-problem is equivialent to the RSA problem which is to compute y 1/e mod N for a G that is mostly ignored in the literature. Assuming Cheon's attack [22] is the optimal success ratio for attacks against the q-DH problem (i.e., SR(B) ≤ q/p for all adversaries B) we obtain log p ≥ 3 log q − 2 log δδ + 2k.
given e. 6 The same relation also hold between the Strong q-problem and the Strong RSA problem which is to compute (e, y 1/e mod N ) for any e > 2.
C Omitted Proofs C.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
In the following let M i denote the i-th query to the signing oracle, and let (σ i , s i ) denote the reply. Let (M * , σ * , s * ) be the forgery output by F. We distinguish between two types of forgers. A Type I forger returns (M * , σ * , s * ) with s * = s i for some i ∈ [q]. A Type II forger returns (M * , σ * , s * ) with s * = s i for all i ∈ [q].
C.1.1 Type I forgers.
Lemma C.1. Let F be a type I forger that (t, q, )-breaks the existential unforgeability of Sig RSA [H] . Then there exists an adversary A that (t , )-breaks the RSA assumption with t ≈ t and
Game 4.
In this game the simulator picks a prime e uniformly from Z 2 r . Moreover, it computes (a i , b i ) ← PHF.TrapEval(τ, M i ) for each queried message M i , i ∈ [q], and (a * , b * ) ← PHF.TrapEval(τ, M * ) for the message M * on which F forges a signature. The simulator aborts, if a i = 0 for some i ∈ [q] with s i = s * , or if gcd(a * , e) = 1, we denote this event with abort PHF . Recall that there are at most m values s i such that s i = s * by Game 1. Furthermore, e ≥ 2 l except with probability 1/2 r−l . Thus, using that H is (m, 1, γ, δ)-evasively programmable, we have
Game 5.
Now the simulator computes a signature on some chosen-message M i by running (a i , b i ) ← PHF.TrapEval(t, M i ) first to determine (a i , b i ), and then computing σ i as
where E i = E\{s i } and E * i = E * \{s i }. The latter equality uses that a i = 0 for all M i with s i = s * by Game 4. This change is only conceptual, and thus
Game 6.
The simulator in Game 6 aborts if two different prefixes are mapped to the same prime. That is, we abort if there exist s, s ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s q } and i, j ∈ [λ] such that F(s |i ) = F(s |j ) and s |i = s |j . This event is denoted with abort coll .
Recall that F(z) = PRF K (µ||z) ⊕ c, where µ is incremented until PRF K (µ||z) ⊕ c is prime. Let us assume PRF K is replaced with a truly random function. Then evaluating F is equivalent to sampling a uniformly random r-bit prime. There are at least 2 r /r such primes by Lemma 2.1, and at most qλ primes are sampled. Applying Lemma 2.3, we conclude that the collision probability for a truly random function is at most rq 2 λ 2 · 2 −r . Now consider the case where the truly random function is instantiated with PRF K , and suppose that a collision occurs with probability Pr[abort coll ]. Then this would allow an attack distinguishing PRF K from a random function with probability at least coll ≥ Pr 
we denote this event with abort div . Recall that φ(n) = 4p q and that F returns only odd primes. Again replacing PRF K with a truly random function, the probability that one out of at most qλ randomly chosen odd r-bit primes equals one of the two odd primes dividing φ(n) is at most (qλ2r)/2 r . Similar to Game 6, we can mount a distinguishing attack against PRF K with success probability at least div ≥ Pr[abort div ] − (qλ2r)/2 r . By assumption we have div ≤ , and thus
Extracting the Solution to the RSA Challenge. Eventually, the forger returns a forgery (M * , σ * , s * ), from which the adversary extracts the solution to the RSA challenge as follows. First it computes z = σ * h b * t∈E * P(t) . Observe here that
From this it computes y = z
, which equals
We have gcd(2a * t∈E * P(t), e) = 1 because e is odd, e t∈E * P(t) by Game 6, and gcd(e, a * ) = 1 by Game 4. Thus, x with x e ≡ y mod N can be extracted from y using Lemma 2.2.
C.1.2 Type II forgers.
Lemma C.2. Let F be a type II forger that (t, q, )-breaks the existential unforgeability of Sig RSA [H] . Then there exists an adversary A that (t , )-breaks the RSA assumption with t ≈ t and
Let X i denote the probability that F is successful in Game i.
Game 0. Game 0 is the existential unforgeability experiment with forger F, thus we have
Game 1.
In this game the simulator chooses the randomness s 1 , . . . , s q in advance, and runs the trapdoor key generation algorithm PHF.TrapGen to generate the group hash function H. Then it runs (κ, τ )
. By the (m, 1, γ, δ)-programmability of H, we have
Game 2. Again we modify the simulator such that chosen-message queries are answered without inverting exponents. Again let E i = E\{s i }, and let g i =ĝ 2 t∈E i P(t) and h i =ĥ
The simulator computes a signature on M i by running (a i , b i ) ← PHF.TrapEval(t, M i ) first to determine (a i , b i ), and then computing σ i as
Game 2 is perfectly indistinguishable from Game 1. Thus,
Game 3.
In this game the simulator guesses the shortest prefix ψ of s * that differs from all prefixes of s 1 , . . . , s q . Note that this prefix must exist, because the Type II-forger will return a forgery (M * , σ * , s * ) with s * ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s q }.
To this end, the simulator proceeds as follows. If q = 0, it samples a bit ψ $ ← {0, 1} at random, and aborts if the forger returns s * with s * |1 = ψ. If q ≥ 0, the simulator picks i ∈ [q] and j ∈ [λ], and sets ψ = s i|j−1 ||b, where b is the complement of the j-th bit of s i . (Recall that we defined the 0-th prefix as the empty string ∅, thus s i|0 = ∅). The simulator aborts if either
• ψ is a prefix of some s i ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s q }, that is, there exists (i , j ) such that ψ = s i |j , or if
• the forger returns (M * , σ * , s * ) such that ψ is not a prefix of s * .
We denote this event with abort prefix . If q = 0, then the simulator aborts with probability 1/2. Otherwise there are qλ possible choices for (i, j) ∈ [q] × [λ]. Thus we have Pr[abort prefix ] ≤ 1 − 1/((q + 1)λ), and therefore
Game 4. We add an abort condition. The simulator aborts, if F(ψ) | t∈E P(t), or (equivalently)
. We denote this event with abort ψcoll .
. Thus, if we replace PRF K with a truly random function, then according to Lemma 2. 3 the probability of a collision among (at most) (q + 1)λ uniformly random primes from [0, 2 r − 1] is bounded by r(q + 1) 2 λ 2 · 2 −r .
We can therefore construct an adversary distinguishing PRF K from a random function with probability at least ψcoll ≥ Pr[abort ψcoll ] − r(q + 1) 2 λ 2 · 2 −r . Since ψcoll ≤ by assumption, we have Pr[abort coll ] ≤ + r(q + 1) 2 λ 2 · 2 −r , and thus
Game 5.
We introduce a number of changes to the simulator, which equal the modifications introduced in Games 7 to 10 in the proof of Lemma C.1.
• We abort if there exists i, j
• We abort if the resolving index µ is greater than r 2 for some s i|j , (i,
• We pick µ * $ ← [r 2 ] uniformly random, and abort if µ * is not the resolving index of ψ. (Game 9)
• Instead of sampling c at random, we set c = PRF(µ * ||ψ) ⊕ e, where e is the uniformly random prime that the simulators pick starting from Game 1. Observe that this defines F(ψ) = e. (Game 10)
With the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma C.1 we have
Game 6.
In this game the simulator picks a prime e uniformly from the interval [2 l , 2 r − 1], computes (a * , b * ) ← PHF.TrapEval(τ, M * ) for the message M * on which F forges a signature, and if gcd(a * , e) = 1, we denote this event with abort PHF . Using that H is (m, 1, γ, δ)-evasively programmable, we have
The RSA Adversary. On input a RSA-challenge (N , e , y), the adversary aborts if e is not a prime in the interval [2 l , 2 r ], and otherwise sets N = N ,ĝ = y, e = e . The latter now defines F(ψ) = e. Otherwise it proceeds like the simulator in Game 6.
As in the proof of Lemma C.1, the success probability of the RSA adversary is at least
Answering Signing Queries. Again the adversary can answer signing queries without computing inverses modulo φ(n) by using the PHF.TrapEval algorithm and Equation (5) .
Extracting the Solution to the RSA Challenge. When the forger returns (M * , σ * , s * ), the adversary computes w = σ * z , where z = {i∈[λ]|s * |i =ψ} F(s * |i ). Note that z = P(s * )/e, since F(ψ) = e. Thus we have w = H(M * )
1/P(s * ) z = H(M * ) 1/e = ĝ 2a * t∈E P(t)ĥeb * t∈E P(t)
1/e =ĝ 2a * t∈E P(t) eĥ b * t∈E P(t) .
From this the adversary computes y as y = w ·ĥ
Again, if we have gcd(2a * t∈E P(t), e) = 1, then the solution to the given RSA challenge can be extracted from y using Lemma 2.2. We have gcd(2a * t∈E * P(t), e) = 1, since e is odd, e t∈E P(t) by Game 4, and gcd(e, a * ) = 1 by Game 6.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Again let M i denote the i-th query to the signing oracle, and let (σ i , s i ) denote the reply. Let (M * , σ * , s * ) be the forgery output by F.
We again distinguish between a Type I forger, returning (M * , σ * , s * ) with s * = s i for some i ∈ [q], and a Type II forger returning (M * , σ * , s * ) with s * = s i for all i ∈ [q].
C.2.1 Type I forgers
The following Lemma proves security against Type I forgers.
Lemma C.3. Let F be a forger of type I that (t, q, )-breaks the existential unforgeability of Sig q-DH [H, D]. Then there exists an adversary A that (t , )-breaks the q-DH assumption with t ≈ t and ≥ δδ 1 q − q m+1 2 mλ − γ .
Proof. We prove Lemma C.3 by a sequence of games. In the following let X i denote the probability that F is successful in Game i.
Game 0.
We define Game 0 as the existential unforgeability experiment with forger F. By definition, we have Pr[X 0 ] = .
Game 1. Now the simulator aborts if there exist (at least) m + 1 indices i 1 , . . . , i m+1 , such that s j = s j for all j, j ∈ {i 1 , . . . , i m+1 }. We denote this event with abort mColl . The s i are picked uniformly from {0, 1} λ , thus by Lemma 2.3 the probability of an m + 1-wise collision is at most Pr[abort mColl ] ≤ q m+1 /2 mλ , which implies
Game 2. In this game the simulator chooses s 1 , . . . , s q $ ← {0, 1} λ at the beginning of the game, and uses s i as randomness for the signature of M i . This change is purely conceptual and oblivious to F, thus does not affect the success probability of F.
Moreover, the simulator guesses the value s * that will be used by F in the forged signature, and aborts if F outputs a forgery (M , σ , s ) with s = s * . We denote this event with abort guess . Since we assume that s * ∈ 
Game 3.
We define Game 3 like the previous game, except that we run the trapdoor key generation algorithm PHF.TrapGen to generate the hash function H. In the following let E = q i=1 {s i } and E * = E\{s * }. The simulator sets g =ĝ t∈E * d(t) and h =ĝ t∈E d(t) .
Recall thatĝ denotes the generator chosen by the Gen procedure. Then the simulator runs (κ, τ ) $ ← PHF.TrapGen(1 k , g, h) to generate hash key κ together with trapdoor τ . Since H is (m, 1, γ, δ) Game 5. Now we change the way chosen-message queries are answered by the simulator. Note that, by the setup of g and h introduced in Game 3, we have
Let E * i and E i denote the sets E * i = E * \{s i } and E i = E\{s i }, and let The simulator computes a signature on M i by running (a i , b i ) ← PHF.TrapEval(τ, M i ) first to determine (a i , b i ), and then computing σ i as
The last equation of (6) The q-DH Adversary. We can now replace the simulator with adversary A. The adversary receives a q-DH challenge (ĝ,ĝ y , . . . ,ĝ y q ) as input, and proceeds like the simulator from Game 6, but without knowing y explicitly.
Set-up of the Public Key. The adversary runs (κ , τ ) $ ← PHF.TrapGen (1 k ,ĝ,ĝ y ) just like the original key generation algorithm. To see that the adversary can compute the input values g and h to PHF.TrapGen as required, recall that g =ĝ t∈E * d(t) =ĝ t∈E * (et+yft) .
Considering the term t∈E * (e t + yf t ) as a polynomial in y, the adversary first computes the coefficients α i of the expansion of the polynomial α(y) = t∈E * (e t + yf t ) = This is possible, since (i) the adversary can compute the coefficients of α(y) from the (e t , f t ), (ii) the adversary has received (ĝ,ĝ y , . . . ,ĝ y q ) as input, and (iii) the polynomial α(y) has degree at most q − 1.
